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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between government revenue and spending in Thailand 
using a nonlinear framework. Both TAR and MTAR models are estimated. The empirical 
results from the estimate of the TAR model show the presence of asymmetry in the long-run 
relationship between revenue and spending. The results of short-run dynamics indicate that 
both revenue and spending respond to budgetary disequilibrium when there is improving 
government budget. Furthermore, bidirectional causality is found. The evidence appears to 
support the fiscal synchronization hypothesis with asymmetric adjustment towards the long-
run equilibrium. This finding implies that policymakers should cut deficits when they exceed 
the threshold level.  
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1. Introduction 
It is well-recognized in the literature that budget deficits can be sustainable in the long-run 
for some countries, especially the US.  Even though budget deficits can be expansionary, they 
are related to political support by the public. Previous studies employ linear cointegration 
tests to investigate the relationship between government revenue and expenditures (e.g. 
Hakkio and Rush, 1991, and Quintos, 1995).1 However, the government budget deficit can be 
sustainable in the long run and policymakers will try to reduce the deficit when it reaches a 
certain threshold level (Arestis et al. 2004: Cipolini et al. 2009, among others). Payne and 
Saunoris (2010) estimate an asymmetric error correction model for the UK and find 
asymmetric adjustment toward long-run equilibrium. Their finding lends support for the 
spend-and-tax hypothesis. Paleologou (2013) examines the revenue-expenditure nexus in 
Sweden, Germany and Greece and finds that asymmetric adjustment towards the long-run 
equilibrium is found for Greece only. Athanesenas et al. (2014) re-examines the revenue-
expenditure relationship for Greece. They find evidence of asymmetric interactions between 
the two variables in both the long- and short-run time horizon. Their evidence supports the 
synchronization hypothesis while the evidence found by Paleologou (2013) supports the 
spend-and-tax hypothesis for Greece. Tiwari and Mutascu (2016) examine the relationship 
between government revenue and spending in Romania using threshold regression. They find 
the existence of nonlinear and asymmetric adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. Their 
results also support the spend-and-tax hypothesis. Saunoris (2015) examines the dynamics of 
                                                           
1
 See a brief description of the four hypotheses pertaining to the revenue-spending relationship in 
Paleologou (2013) and Tiwari and Mutascu (2016). 
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the intertemporal budget constraint in the US states. The overall results lend support to the 
tax-and-spend hypothesis even though the dynamics differ in some states. 
Thailand has been confronted with larger sizes of budgetary disequilibria as a result of the 
global financial crisis beginning in 2008. Figure 1 shows fluctuations in the Thai government 
budgets measured by surpluses and deficits as percentage of GDP. 
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                              Figure 1. Budgetary Disequilibrium in Thailand, 1993-2016. 
 
The smoother period of fluctuations in the government budgets seems to be few years after 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between government revenue 
and spending by employing nonlinear cointegration tests using quarterly data during 1993 
and 2016. The threshold autoregressive (TAR) and momentum threshold autoregressive 
(MTAR) models are used to test whether the revenue-spending nexus is nonlinear and 
asymmetric. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the data and estimation 
techniques used in the analysis. Section 3 presents empirical results and the last section 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and Estimation Techniques 
2.1 Data 
Quarterly data on general government revenue (Rt), and spending (Gt) are retrieved from the 
website of the Bank of Thailand. Nominal GDP are obtained from the Office of National 
Economic and Social Development Board. All series are measured in millions of baht (Thai 
currency). The government budget as a percentage of GDP is computed as the difference 
between revenue and spending divided by GDP. The time series data cover the period from 
1993 to 2016. The revenue and expenditure series are transformed to the logarithmic series. 
The time series property is obtained by performing unit root tests. 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests with optimal lag length determined by Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) are performed to determine the property of time series data used 
in the analysis. The results of unit root tests are reported in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Results of Unit Root Tests. 
Variable ADF Statistic (constant) ADF statistic (constant+trend) 
R -0.656 -1.979 
∆R -5.007*** -4.978*** 
G -1.228 -2.496 
∆G -17.367*** -17.326*** 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
The results in Table 1 indicate that the revenue and expenditure series are non-stationary in 
level, but they are stationary in first differences. Therefore, they are integrated of order one, 
i.e., I(1) series. 
2.2 Estimation Techniques 
The starting point on the adjustment of revenue and spending toward the long-run 
equilibrium can be drawn from the studies by Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Cunado et al. 
(2004). Testing for cointegration between government and expenditure time series can reveal 
evidence that support the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. An empirical 
model for a long-run relationship between government revenue and spending using the power 
functional form is expressed as:  
 
                                                    ttt AGSGR ε
β=                                                            (1) 
 
where GRt denotes government revenue, GSt denotes government spending, εt is the error 
term, A is a constant, and β is the coefficient. By using log transformation of equation (1), the 
linear equation can be expressed as: 
 
                                                 ttt eGR ++= βα                                                            (2) 
 
where Rt is the log of government revenue, Gt is the log of government spending, α is the log 
of A, and et is the log of εt. By allowing for a shift in the intercept, the long-run equation can 
be rewritten as: 
 
                                              tttt eGDR +++= βδα                                                     (3) 
 
where Dt is the dummy variable that captures the impact of September 2008 US subprime 
crisis, which became the global financial crisis. In this respect, it can be claimed that the 
crisis will affect the decision of fiscal policymakers. This dummy variable takes the value of 
1 at the time the crisis occurred and after the crisis, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The residual-based test for cointegration proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) is used to 
determine whether there is a linear long-run relationship between government revenue and 
spending. The residual series obtained from the estimate of equation (3) is used to test the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration. The test equation is expressed as: 
                                             tit
k
i itt
ueee +∆+=∆ −=− ∑ ˆˆˆ 11 βρ                                         (4) 
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where k is the optimal lag length determined by AIC. The ADF statistic, which is the t-
statistic of the coefficient ρ is compared with MacKinnon (1996) critical value. If the ADF 
statistic is larger than the critical value, the null hypothesis will be rejected. On the contrary, 
the null hypothesis will be accepted if the ADF statistic is smaller than the critical value. 
In case of the absence of linear cointegration between revenue and spending, it is possible 
that the long-run relationship is nonlinear and asymmetric. Therefore, the threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) and momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) models are utilized. 
The two models are residual-based tests developed by Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders 
and Siklos (2001). The residuals from the estimate of equation (3) are decomposed and the 
test equation is expressed as: 
                                  tit
k
i ittttt
veeIeIe +∆+−+=∆ −=−− ∑ ˆˆ)1(ˆˆ 11211 βρρ                      (5) 
where vt ~ iid.(0,σ2) and the lagged augmented term (∆êt-i) can be added to yield uncorrelated 
residuals of the estimates of equation (5). The Heaviside indicator function for TAR is 
specified in equation (6) while this function for MTAR is specified in equation (7), which 
are: 
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where the threshold value τ is endogenously determined by Bai and Perron (1998) tests of 1 
to M globally determined thresholds. If the evidence indicates the existence of linear 
cointegration between revenue and spending, the time series dynamics of the relationship 
between the two variables can be explored by a bivariate vector autocorrelation mechanism 
VECM. The VECM can be expressed as: 
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where k is the lag order, λ1 and λ2 are the coefficients showing the speeds of adjustment. The 
short-run dynamics allow for testing the alternative hypotheses pertaining to the revenue-
spending nexus. The coefficients of the lagged differences for government revenue and 
spending show the short-run dynamics while the coefficients of the asymmetric errors 
correction terms are the speeds of adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium. Equations (8) 
and (9) can also be used to test for short-run causality between revenue and spending. 
3. Empirical Results 
Since the revenue and expenditure series are integrated of order one, the Engle and Granger 
(1987) residual based test for cointegration, which relies on the ADF test, is performed by 
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taking into account of known structural break (the impact of 2008 global economic crisis. 
The results of ADF cointegration test are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Results of the Residual-Based Cointegration Test.  
       Rt = 4.696*** + 0.306***Dt + 0.617***Gt 
              (4.875)        (4.067)            (7.919) 
       ADF Statistic = -2.570 (p-value = 0.455) 
Note: t-statistic in parenthesis, *** indicates significance at the 1% level, p-value is provided by 
MacKinnon (1996). 
 
The results in Table 2 show that the possible long-run relationship between government 
revenue and spending is significantly positive. A 1% increase in government expenditure 
causes revenue to increase by 0.62%. Furthermore, the impact of the global economic crisis 
strengthens this relationship. However, the ADF statistic accepts the null hypothesis that the 
series are not cointegrated.2 Therefore, it can be concluded that the government revenue and 
expenditure do not share a long-run stochastic trend. 
Since the standard tests of cointegration between series assume that the cointegrating 
equation is time invariant, the rejection of cointegration might be due to a shift in the 
cointegrating equation or the relationship might be nonlinear and asymmetric. To overcome 
this problem, the TAR and MTAR models are estimated. The results are shown in Table 3. 
The lag of augmented term is 1 (κ =1) for the estimated TAR and MTAR models. The 
estimates of TAR and MTAR models show that the null hypothesis of no threshold 
cointegration cannot be rejected at the 1% level of significance.  
Table 3 
Estimates of the Budgetary Disequilibrium: TAR and MTAR Models. 
Parameters Models 
 TAR MTAR 
ρ1 -1.378***(-10.369) -1.825***(-8.250) 
ρ2 -0.679***(-3.659) -0.947***(-7.285) 
Threshold Value -0.118 0.240 
F2,91 (ρ1=ρ2=0) 55.937*** 57.318*** 
F1,91 (ρ1=ρ2) 10.957*** 12.345*** 
κ 1 1 
AIC -0.452 -0.465 
Q(2) 3.631 (p-value=0.163) 7.499**(p-value= 0.024) 
JB 2.417 (0.299) 4.546 (0.103) 
Note: t-Statistic in parenthesis. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
κ is the number of lag. 
 
Evidence of threshold cointegration in terms of TAR and MTAR is found since the F-statistic 
of the TAR model for testing the null hypothesis that ρ1=ρ2=0 is 55.94 is larger than the 
critical value of 9.39 at the 1% level of significance while the F-statistic for the MTAR model 
                                                           
2
 The p-value provided by MacKinnon (1996) does not account for deterministic regressors (intercept 
and dummy variable). Using automatic lag selection, the optimal lag in this test is 4 determined by 
AIC.  
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is 57.32 is larger than the critical value of 10.67 at the 1% level of significance.3 Also, 
evidence of asymmetry is found by testing the null hypothesis that ρ1=ρ2 because this 
hypothesis is rejected by the standard F-tests. The Jarque-Bera statistic (JB) accepts the null 
hypothesis of normality in the residuals in both models. For the MTAR model, there appears 
to have serial correlation in the residuals.4 Therefore, the estimate of TAR model seems to be 
more reliable. The results from the TAR estimate are used in the analysis of asymmetric 
VECM. The results from the estimated asymmetric VECM are reported in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Results from the Estimates of Bivariate Threshold VECM. 
Threshold Estimate of the Lagged Error = -0.118  
 Regime 1  Regime 2  
 ∆Rt ∆Gt ∆Rt ∆Gt 
Intercept 0.030** 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
0.177 
(0.022) 
0.034* 
(0.020) 
1ˆ −te  -0.897*** (0.118) 
0.619*** 
(0.118) 
-0.164 
(0.209) 
0.363* 
(0.183) 
∆Rt-1 0.175* 
(0.099) 
-0.458*** 
(0.099) 
-0.247** 
(0.105) 
-0.183** 
(0.092) 
∆Gt-1 -0.350*** 
(0.093) 
-0.303*** 
(0.093) 
-0.169 
(0.115) 
-0.183*** 
(0.101) 
Adjusted R2 0.415 0.343 0.046 0.178 
F-Statistic 22.955*** 
[prob.=0.000] 
17.186*** 
[prob.=0.000] 
2.495* 
[prob.=0.065] 
3.969** 
[prob.=0.049] 
Q(1) 0.326 
[prob.=0.568] 
1.447 
[prob.=0.229] 
2.495 
[prob.=0.065] 
3.969 
[prob.=0.123] 
Observations 62  32  
Note: Standard error in parenthesis. ***, **and *indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
Since 1111 ˆˆˆˆ −−− −−−= tttt GDRe αδα , 0ˆ 1 >−te  indicates budget surplus while 0ˆ 1 <−te  indicates 
a budget deficit. The results from the estimated TAR model show that the threshold level of 
the residuals is -0.118, for which the size of budget deficit appears to be 2.48 trillions of baht. 
The first regime, which is the normal regime, contains 66% of observations with budget 
surpluses and deficits when the deficits are equal to and above the threshold value of 2.48 
trillions of baht. The second regime with 34% of observations, contains budget deficits less 
than the threshold value (in minus sign), which indicates that it is the unusual regime with 
larger sizes of budget deficits. The results in Table 4 show that the coefficient of the error 
correction term (et-1) is highly significant in the ∆Rt equation in the first regime. On the 
contrary, the coefficient of the error correction term ( 1ˆ −te ) in the ∆Rt  equation is insignificant 
in the second regime. Therefore, it can be concluded that the sizes of budget deficits of larger 
than 2.48 trillions of baht in absolute value can cause deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium that cannot be corrected. For the ∆Gt equation in the first regime, government 
                                                           
3
 According to Hansen and Seo (2002), the F-test for TAR and MTAR models has a non-standard 
distribution due to the presence of nuisance parameters that are only identified by the alternative 
hypothesis. Therefore, the test critical values must be computed. However, the critical values are 
obtained from Wane et al. (2004) for two variables with the lag of 1. 
4
 By increasing the number of lags, the problem of serial correlation is still present. 
7 
 
spending responds positively to budget surpluses and deficits in absolute value that are larger 
than the threshold value. By contrast, the coefficient of the error correction term in the ∆Gt 
equation is not significant at the 5% level. Therefore, government spending does not respond 
to large budget deficits. In other words, the responses of government revenue and spending 
are apparent when there is an improving government budget, but these responses disappear 
when there is a worsening budget deficit. This finding is contrary to the finding by 
Paleologou (2013) in the case of Greece. Therefore, policymakers should not allow too large 
budget deficits because they cannot be adjusted to the normal level if political support is 
important to the government.  
The standard causality tests are performed on the estimated bivariate VECM in the first 
regime. The results are reported in Table 5.  
Table 5 
Results of Granger Causality tests. 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic p-Value 
∆Gt does not cause ∆Rt. 14.118*** 0.000 
∆Rt does not cause ∆Gt. 21,201*** 0.000 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
The Wald F-test is performed on the coefficient of ∆Gt-1 in the ∆Rt equation while the test is 
performed on the coefficient of ∆Rt-1 on the ∆Gt equation. The results in Table 5 reveal that 
the null hypotheses that ∆Gt does not cause ∆Rt and that ∆Rt does not cause ∆Gt are rejected 
at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, the results confirm the existence of bidirectional 
causality between revenue and spending. The results confirm that both revenue and spending 
respond to improving budget. The evidence of bidirectional causality supports the fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Musgrave (1966), 
which postulates that the voters’ choice determines the concurrent adjustment in both tax 
revenue and spending. This finding is in line with the finding by Tiwari and Mutascu (2016) 
in the case of Romania and Athanasenas et al. (2014) in the case of Greece. 
4. Conclusion 
This study examines the nexus between government revenue and spending in the case of 
Thailand during 1993 and 2016. To detect the possibility of asymmetric adjustment toward 
long-run equilibrium, the TAR and MTAR models are used. The results show that both 
models exhibit nonlinear cointegration between government revenue and spending because 
the null hypothesis of no threshold cointegration can be rejected. However, the estimated 
MTAR model does not pass all diagnostic tests. Therefore, the TAR model is suitable and 
lends support for the presence of asymmetric adjustment process toward long-run 
equilibrium. By finding the evidence in favor of nonlinear cointegration between revenue and 
spending, the time series dynamics of the relationship between the two variables are explored 
in a bivariate VECM framework. It is found that government revenue and spending respond 
well to budget surpluses and deficits when the deficits are not larger than the absolute value 
of the threshold level. On the contrary, the two variables do not respond to budget deficits 
when the absolute values of the deficits are larger than the threshold level. 
The finding in this paper gives some policy implications. Even though budget deficits can be 
expansionary to the economy, there is an upper limit for policymakers to design appropriate 
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budget to gain political support. The size of budget deficit beyond the threshold can be out of 
control. 
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